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Abstract: 
 
The maintenance of system flow is critical for effective network operation.  Any type of 
disruption to network facilities (arcs/nodes) potentially risks loss of service, leaving users 
without access to important resources.  It is therefore an important goal of planners to 
assess infrastructures for vulnerabilities, identifying those vital nodes/arcs whose 
debilitation would compromise the most source-sink (s-t) interaction or system flow.  
Due to the budgetary limitations of disaster management agencies, protection/fortification 
and planning for the recovery of these vital infrastructure facilities is a logical and 
efficient proactive approach to reducing worst-case risk of service disruption.  Given 
damage to a network, evaluating the potential for flow between s-t pairs requires 
assessing the availability of an operational s-t path.  Recent models proposed for 
identifying infrastructure vital to system flow have relied on enumeration of all s-t paths 
to support this task.  This paper proposes an alternative model constraint structure that 
does not require complete enumeration of s-t paths, providing computational benefits 
over existing models.  To illustrate the model, an application to a practical infrastructure 
planning problem is presented. 
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Introduction 
 
Assessing networks for infrastructure vulnerabilities is an important component of 
strategically planning for disruptive events.  Vital infrastructure are those facilities 
(arcs/nodes) that are most crucial in facilitating/ensuring system operation and therefore, 
their disruption can pose considerable risk to network service.  In many network 
infrastructures, the loss of only one or a few critical facilities can have severe 
repercussions on the operability of a system, resulting in wide-ranging service disruptions 
[1-2].  Hence, evaluating the operability of network infrastructures (e.g, military supply 
lines, highways, electrical power grids, pipelines, telecommunication systems etc.) given 
intentional or unplanned disruption is a planning priority [3].  One option for enhancing 
the state of preparedness for a networked system is though hardening or fortifying 
network facilities to increase their resistance to damage [4-9].  Fortification of vital 
facilities can be viewed as reducing/eliminating the worst-case risk.  Thus, enhancing the 
resilience of vital facilities to disruptive events is an important preemptive consideration 
in any disaster recovery plan (DRP) [10].  This is a particularly significant issue when 
trying to establish DRPs in response to targeted threats, such as terrorist attack.  Since 
terrorist activities are often geared toward inflicting the greatest damage to infrastructure 
operation with the least effort, taking away the terrorists’ best (highest value) options can 
in effect reduce the burden associated with planning for and recovering from a disaster.  
Identification of vital facilities is also a critical step in responding to a disaster.  Planning 
for a worst-case disaster can help ensure that adequate resources are in place to address 
system recovery.  Regardless of the situation of concern, budgetary resources available 
for disaster management planning are often limited and there is a need to prioritize DRP 
efforts [10].  In other words, it is crucial that the most important facilities for ensuring 
network functionality be given priority in plan implementation.  Network-based 
infrastructures, however, are complex topologically as well as functionally, and 
identification of vital facilities is a challenging endeavor.  Further contributing to the 
complexities of this important planning problem is that many criteria exist for assessing 
the importance of infrastructure components, as do many approaches for modeling 
system performance.   
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In the following section, methodologies for examining facility significance within 
a system are discussed.  Among these methodologies, those that address the preservation 
of existing network activity, or system flow, are highlighted given their importance when 
planning for potential loss of service.  Next, existing approaches for assessing the 
potential for loss of system flow are reviewed.  In order to better deal with computational 
issues surrounding these approaches, a new model is proposed to ascertain the 
survivability of system flow given network disruption.  An evaluation of Ohio’s interstate 
highway network is then detailed to illustrate the benefits of the proposed formulation.  
Finally, discussion and conclusions are provided. 
 
Background 
 
The importance of network infrastructure to associated activity is dependant on the 
location and role of nodes and arcs within a system.  Therefore, how topological 
relationships between network facilities are considered in vulnerability analyses is a 
critical issue.  One way of assessing facility importance within a network is to model the 
worst-case impact to network performance provided some assumptions on the type of 
disruptive event expected.  Facilities associated with a worst-case scenario are suggestive 
of their importance to network operation.  However, central to this type of analysis is that 
the disruptive potential of an event can be measured in a variety of ways and there are 
many levels of disruption that can occur.  First, disruptive events in networks typically 
involve nodes, arcs, or any combination thereof.  Thus, a critical issue is how network 
performance is impacted by damage to arcs and nodes.  There are many operational 
characteristics of networks that can be considered important to system performance.  For 
instance, level of system connectivity/flow, maximum flow capacity, and cost of 
transportation or service can all be affected by facility damage.  The importance of an 
arc/node to any of these performance measures depends on the availability of other 
facilities and the topology of the system.  Further complicating matters is that the 
importance of network facilities can also be measured by how their loss indirectly 
impacts other system interactions.  For instance, loss of service between two nodes can 
additionally impact the ability of the two nodes to fulfill interactions with other 
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connected nodes.  Such a case occurs when assessing how regional economic activities 
are impacted by disruptions to transportation infrastructure [5,7,11].  Another critical 
issue relates to the level of disruption expected from an event.  The disruption level may 
be represented by the number of facilities anticipated to be involved or the cost associated 
with removing operational capacity or decreasing operational efficiency.  Facilities that 
are vital to network operation at one assumed level of disruption (e.g., a two node 
disruption) may not necessarily coincide with those vital at another level (e.g., a four 
node disruption).  Given the myriad of considerations available for assessing network 
vulnerability, interpretations of vulnerability can be subject to a wide range of variability. 
 
Network optimization methods have received considerable attention in the search 
for facilities vital to network operation.  A variety of approaches have been developed to 
assess network vulnerabilities given some interpretation of facility importance to system 
performance.  Many optimization models, also known as interdiction models, have been 
developed to identify important facilities with regard to impact on system service cost 
[6,12-17], flow capacity [18-23], as well as system connectivity and flow [24-26].  These 
methods can be used to identify bounds for network vulnerability in terms of facilities 
associated with worst-case (or best-case) impacts to system performance.  Constraints on 
the amount of resources available for disruption of network cost, capacity, or system flow 
are often stipulated in accordance with assumptions related to the type of damage 
anticipated.  Using such techniques for establishing vulnerability bounds provides 
extremely useful insights for strategic planning efforts, such as DRP development, geared 
at protecting or fortifying critical network facilities. 
 
Of particular interest in this paper is identifying network facilities most vital to 
system flow.  It is assumed in this context that there are a number of sources and sinks (s-
t) of flow within a network and that they interact at a specified level.  This interaction or 
flow between s-t pairs  stf  is the measure of system performance considered vulnerable 
to disruption.  From a disaster management perspective, this is the activity or service at 
risk and possibly needing restoration post-disaster.  Here, the level of interaction between 
two nodes is considered independent of the level of interaction between other nodal pairs.  
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It is also assumed that s-t activity is supported by the availability of operational s-t paths 
and that connectivity can be achieved given the presence of an operational path, 
regardless of its characteristics.  As discussed earlier, identifying the worst-case disaster 
outcomes can contribute significant insight to the disaster planning process.  Several 
optimization methods have been proposed to identify the nodes or arcs associated with 
the worst-case impact to system flow, given restrictions on the number of facilities 
damaged.  In this context, facility damage equates to the complete debilitation of 
individual components.  Myung and Kim [24] propose an approach to assess the 
survivability of a network to facility disruption.  To address this concern, they develop an 
integer program to maximize, or provide an upper bound on, the total flow rendered 
incapable of interaction, given the loss of p arcs.  For an uncapacitated network G with 
node set N and arc set A (G=(N,A)), Myung and Kim [24] formulate their survivability 
model as follows: 
 
Notation: 
Ns  = index of sources 
Nt  = index of sinks 
Ai   = index of network arcs  
fst= flow observed between s-t 
 index of paths 
stN =set of paths capable of establishing s-t connectivity 
p = number of arcs to be disabled 


otherwise 0,
removed is  arc if ,1 i
X i  


otherwise 0,
, between  existspath  no if ,1 ts
Z st  
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stst ZfMaximize          (1) 
s.t. 
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i
i pX           (2) 
 5
st
Ai
sti NtsZX 



,,           
)(
            (3) 
  i,X i  10                              (4)            ts,Z st ,10               
 
Objective (1) maximizes system flow disrupted.  Constraint (2) restricts the number of 
facilities lost to p.  Constraints (3) state that every path connecting a s-t pair must be 
impacted by facility damage before s-t connectivity can be considered lost.  Finally, 
Constraints (4) reflect the binary nature of the decisions to be made.  Heuristic 
procedures are suggested by Myung and Kim [24] for establishing upper and lower 
bounds associated with this model formulation.  Murray et al. [25] further consider the 
possibility that both an exact upper and lower bound on flow loss may be of interest.  An 
integer program, the Flow Interdiction Model (FIM), is developed to establish these 
bounds and identify associated vital facilities. 
 
The models proposed by both Myung and Kim [24] and Murray et al. [25] rely 
upon specification of s-t paths as model input.  In other words, all potential paths of 
movement between s-t pairs (and the facilities involved in those paths) are explicitly 
tracked in the proposed models (e.g., Constraints (3)).  If a component facility of a path is 
damaged, then that path is no longer available to that s-t pair.  If there are no s-t paths 
available due to facility damage, then interaction or flow between the pair is disrupted.  
For example, Figure 1 shows a network with a single s-t pair.  In this network, there are 4 
paths connecting s and t: 1) s-3-1-t, 2) s-3-2-t, 3) s-2-t, and 4) s-2-3-1-t.  If node 1 is 
destroyed, 2 s-t paths remain operational.  If nodes 3 and 1 are destroyed, one s-t path is 
still available.  However, if nodes 1 and 2 are disabled, then no s-t paths exist and s-t flow 
is obviously disrupted, corresponding to 1stZ .  The system flow impacted is the sum of 
all s-t flows disrupted 

 st
s t
st Zf , and is the quantity that is to be maximized.  The 
premise behind system flow approaches is that if a cutset of nodes/arcs between a s-t pair 
is disrupted, then connectivity or flow between that s-t pair is disrupted.  From a 
budgetary perspective, damage to a minimum cutset inflicts the most damage to s-t 
interaction with the greatest efficiency.  These path-based models are extremely flexible 
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since an analyst has control over which s-t paths are significant to specific planning 
applications.  A significant issue with models that involve tracking feasible paths 
between network sources and sinks is that as network size increases, the number of 
possible s-t paths can quickly become unmanageable.  For instance, in the 23 node, 34 arc 
example presented later in this paper, hundreds of s-t paths exists for each s-t pair, giving 
nearly 60,000 paths and an equal number of Constraints (3).   
 
Identifying approaches for reducing model size is a necessary component of 
addressing many large network optimization problems.  Often, much of a model’s size is 
attributable to ensuring that network structure is adequately represented.  In the context of 
modeling impacts to system flow, techniques have been developed to help reduce the 
complexities associated with accounting for all network paths.  For instance, Myung and 
Kim [24] present a preprocessing approach for determining beforehand whether an s-t 
pair could potentially be impacted by the level of damage specified.  Only s-t pairs 
capable of being disrupted are then considered in the model and, as a result, less paths 
need be to considered.  Additionally, path reduction strategies can be applied to 
dramatically eliminate paths in many instances.  For example, Murray et al. [25] show 
that in many cases redundant or equivalent paths exist and their removal can decrease 
computational requirements without jeopardizing optimality.  Another way of reducing 
the computational burden associated with accounting for s-t path availability is to remove 
paths from consideration that are unlikely to impact model decisions.  Typically, these 
approaches involve setting a threshold on the length of paths retained for analysis.  For 
instance, the importance of arcs to s-t connectivity is likely in many cases to be 
sufficiently accounted for in shorter s-t paths, and hence inclusion of longer, circuitous 
paths may be unnecessary.  Applications of such reduction strategies can be found in 
models of distributed systems [27], supply networks [28], hub networks [29] and other 
transportation systems [30].  Although faster solutions times, and in many cases, optimal 
solutions can be obtained from this type of variable reduction strategy, optimality cannot 
be guaranteed [28,30-32]. Regardless of the model reduction strategy employed, the 
number of paths remaining may nonetheless present computational difficulties, especially 
as network size increases.  Given model limitations, ways of coping with the intricacies 
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associated with larger network applications need to be explored.  The remainder of this 
paper proposes one such approach. 
 
Figure 1.  Single s-t network example 
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Path Aggregation in Vulnerability Modeling 
 
In order to address the computational challenges associated with path-based models, this 
paper develops an alternative constraint structure for establishing an upper bound on 
worst-case network disruptions.  The model is designed for efficient computation of an 
upper bound on system connectivity or flow loss and is equivalent to path-based models 
involving full specification of all s-t paths.  Given this equivalency, exact solutions are 
easily obtained.  The proposed constraints act to summarize s-t movement possibilities 
and do not require the a priori identification of all paths, so fewer constraints are needed.  
The model is formulated to evaluate disruption to directed arcs, but can easily be 
modified to consider node disruption.  This alternative flow interdiction model 
incorporating path aggregation constraints (PAC) can be formulated as follows. 
 
Additional notation: 
 
Nmkji ,,,  = indices of nodes  
iNi   toconnecteddirectly  facilities ofset    
jN j   toconnecteddirectly  facilities ofset    
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
otherwise 0
disrupted is , arc if 1 ji
X ij  


otherwise 0
eunavailabl is  and  nodesbetween  connection a if 1 ji
Zij  
 

s t
ststZfMaximize   (5) 
s.t. 
pX
i Nj
ij
i


  (6) 
 
iijij NjiZX  ,     0   (7) 
jiijkjik NNkjiZXX  ,,0   (8) 
jiijmjkmik NmNkjiZXZX  ,,,0  (9) 
  iij Nji,X  ,10     (10)  
  ji,Zij ,10   
 
As in Myung and Kim [24] and Murray et al. [25], objective (5) maximizes total 
system flow disrupted, and is exactly as specified in (1).  Constraint (6) stipulates the 
number of facilities to be disrupted.  Constraints (7)-(9) state that i-j flow cannot be 
disrupted unless no possibility for i-j movement exists.  More specifically, Constraints (7) 
consider movement between two adjacent nodes.  If a direct link between these nodes is 
present, then connectivity between the pair (Zij) cannot be compromised.  When two 
nodes are separated by a single, adjacent node (a 2-step connection), Constraints (8) state 
that if both intervening arcs are available, then connectivity between i-j (Zij) has to exist.  
Essentially, both Constraints (7) & (8) act to account for all paths less than two steps in 
length.  Constraints (9) deal specifically with possible routings where 2 or more 
intervening nodes occur between an i-j pair (more than a 2-step connection).  These are 
the path aggregation constraints (PAC), which account for the availability of all paths 
greater than two steps in length.  In this case, if an arc between i and a directly connected 
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node k (Xik), an arc between j and a directly connected node m (Xmj), and a path between k 
and m (Zkm) are available, then there is connectivity between i and j (Zij).  Since the model 
objective maximizes the weighted sum of Zst, then Zij will seek to be one whenever 
possible.  Of course, Zij can only be disrupted given the absence of all paths (one, two, 
and multistep) between i-j pair.  Finally, Constraints (10) impose binary integer 
restrictions on decision variables.   
 
In this formulation, all paths do not need to be directly specified because all 
movement possibilities (involving one or many steps) are accounted for collectively in 
Constraints (7)-(9).  This constraint structure works by summarizing i-j movement 
options by defining the necessary components of i-j paths, the beginning and ending arcs 
as well as connectivity between the two.  Three main types of paths can occur:  1) 1-step 
or direct i-j connections, 2) 2 –step or connections involving an intermediate node 
adjacent to both the beginning and ending nodes, and 3) multi-step paths involving more 
than 2 steps.  Paths of type 1 and 2 are easily defined explicitly for each i-j relationship 
and require a nominal number of constraints.  However, for connections involving more 
than one intervening node (type 3) numerous paths may be involved.  It is in this case 
where the PAC constraints eliminate the need for path enumeration.  The PAC are 
recursive constraints that act to summarize a set of movement possibilities.  That is, each 
decision on i-j connectivity is influenced by the connectivity of other i-j pairs.  Unless all 
movement possibilities summarized by the PAC are affected by a disaster, i-j movement 
cannot be disrupted.  This is done by using a single PAC constraint representative of all i-
j paths beginning and ending with the same two arcs.  Here this is accomplished by 
tracking the availability of the beginning and ending arcs as well as the presence of 
connectivity between the two.  Ascertaining whether connectivity exists between the arcs 
is then derived as a byproduct of evaluating connectivity for other i-j pairs.  Figure 1 is 
used to illustrate this concept.  In this example, establishing the availability of a 
connection between s-t involves the existence of at least a two step connection.  
Specifically, potential for movement between s-t is tracked by:  
 Constraints (7): 03_3_  ss ZX , 02_2_  ss ZX , 03_23_2  ZX , 
01_31_3  ZX , 02_32_3  ZX , 0_2_2  tt ZX , and 0_1_1  tt ZX  
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 Constraints (8): 0__22_  tsts ZXX  and 01_21_23_2  ZXX  
 Constraints (9): 0__11_33_  tsts ZXZX , 
0__22_33_  tsts ZXZX ,  
  and 0__11_22_  tsts ZXZX .   
Therefore, if the arcs associated with node 3 are disabled, then constraints 
02_2_  ss ZX , 0_2_2  tt ZX , and 0__22_  tsts ZXX  still ensure the 
availability of an unobstructed s-t connection (Zst=0) via node 2.  Again, the benefit to 
structuring the model in this way is that complete paths need not be identified for each s-t 
pair, and only direct nodal connections are required input.  In path-based models, 
movement possibilities are independently considered for each s-t pair and a set of path 
constraints is needed for each s-t pair (of which there can be many).  The number of these 
paths can grow exponentially with network size.  On the other hand, the PAC rely on 
establishing the presence of connectivity between all nodes and a smaller set of 
constraints is needed instead for each i-j pair.  Given the degree of each node k, this set of 
i-j constraints includes at maximum: 1) |N|*|N| of Constraints (7), 2) 
i
ik   of 
Constraints (8), and 3) 
i j
ji kk * of Constraints (9) if a fully connected network is 
considered.  At first glance, for this single s-t example it may appear that there are few 
computational benefits to this model formulation over its path-based counterparts.  If one 
considers every pair of nodes in this network as source-sink pairings, then 64 s-t paths are 
required versus 60 constraints using PAC.  However, the structural benefits of the PAC 
become more readily apparent for large networks where there are many s-t pairs and 
where the number of possible s-t paths can increase exponentially with network size.  
These computational advantages are highlighted in the next section.   
 
Ohio’s Vital Interstate Infrastructure 
 
The network vulnerability model of Myung and Kim [24] (eq. (1)-(4)) (referred to M&K 
from this point on) as well as the equivalent PAC version developed here (eq. (5)-(10)) 
are applied to address the vulnerability of Ohio’s trucking activity to interstate highway 
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disruption.  In Figure 2, this portion of the nation’s interstate system is shown along with 
15 metropolitan statistical areas (MSA), representing generators and attractors of 
highway traffic within Ohio.  In total, this network is composed of 23 vertices (15 of 
which represent MSAs) and 34 undirected edges.  Here inter-MSA linkages are modeled 
as undirected edges for illustrative purposes (directed arcs could also be considered).  For 
our purposes, trucking between the MSAs is considered to be the measure of network 
performance vulnerable to network disruption, and hence, damage to network linkages is 
of concern.  Given the focus on inter-MSA edges, the intricacies of the interstate system 
within each MSA are not considered.  Trucking flow data for the year 2000 was obtained 
from the Ohio Department of Transportation and was aggregated to the MSA level.  
Given that each of the 15 MSAs interacts with all other MSAs, there are 210 source-sink 
pairs in this network that can potentially be impacted by edge disruption.   
 
Figure 2.  Ohio’s interstate system 
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Both the M&K model and PAC version are generated for the network shown in Figure 2 
using C++ code and are solved for all levels of edge disruption (p=1-34) using ILOG’s 
CPLEX 10.01 mixed integer program solver (on a Xeon 3.0GHz processor with 4GB 
RAM).  For the M&K model, 59,791 simple s-t paths need to be specified a priori.  The 
enumeration and redundancy reduction required to identify these paths consumes nearly 
30 minutes of computational effort alone.  Additionally, each of these paths then 
translates into a model constraint.  In contrast, only 2,074 constraints are required when 
employing PAC constraints.  This requires approximately 4 constraints per i-j pair, 
whereas in path-based formulations hundreds of paths exist for each s-t pair.  For 
example, assessing connectivity between Toledo and Lima requires only 3 constraints to 
be specified: 
1.  0__  LimaToledoLimaToledo ZX  
2.  0____  LimaToledoLimaDaytonDaytonClevelandClevelandToledo ZXZX  
3.  0___sec70/69sec70/69_  LimaToledoLimaDaytonDaytontionInterItionInterIToledo ZXZX  
Of course, additional constraints are then needed to determine Cleveland-Dayton, I69/70 
Interchange-Dayton connectivity, and so on.  On the other hand, in the M&K formulation 
using all paths for Toledo-Lima flow, 321 paths need to be accounted for, some up to 20 
steps long. 
 
All 34 problem instances were solved to optimality.  All solution results are 
identical to those obtained using the M&K formulation, identifying the combination of p 
edges that if damaged, would result in the maximum service disruption.  For example, the 
results indicate that 25 disabled edges would disrupt 100% of network s-t activity.  
Although damage to a single edge cannot disconnect any MSA from the interstate system 
(p=1), simultaneous disruption of 2 or 3 edges (p=2 or 3) can impact over 18% of total 
daily truck traffic.  In either case the solution involves a cutset resulting in the loss of 
interstate access for the Hamilton MSA.  If four edges (p=4) are simultaneously lost in a 
disaster, then over 37% of s-t activity could potentially be impacted.  As shown in Figure 
3, this involves edge debilitating incidents to I-80 between Toledo and Cleveland, I-70 
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between Dayton and Columbus, I-75 between Hamilton and Cincinnati, and I-74 between 
Indianapolis and Cincinnati.  Notice these 4 edge form a cutset disconnecting Hamilton, 
Dayton, Lima, and Toledo from the Ohio’s interstate system and the remaining MSAs.   
 
Though the model results produced by the M&K and PAC varieties are 
equivalent, solution times and computational effort are not.  On average only a little over 
one second was needed to solve each instance using PAC constraints (see Table 1).  This 
is in stark contrast with the average solution time of 84 seconds needed to solve the more 
heavily constrained path-based version.  In terms of computational effort involved in 
model solution, in the PAC models very little overall effort was required (see Table 1), 
with an average of 898 iterations and 6 branches involved.  In contrast, an average of 28 
branches and nearly 4,500 iterations were needed to solve the M&K model.   
 
Figure 3.  Vital infrastructure associated with disruption of 4 edges (p=4) 
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Table 1.  Summary model solutions 
p
objective* PAC** time (sec)
PAC 
branches
PAC 
iterations
M&K*** 
time (sec)
M&K 
branches
M&K 
iterations
1 0.0 4.844 26 6,073 256.641 41 5,865
2 22,014.5 3.172 0 1,482 106.766 2 3,974
3 22,014.5 7.859 85 7,094 243.438 60 8,801
4 44,151.0 5.375 4 2,602 105.984 4 3,896
5 48,008.0 7.36 36 5,518 216.188 37 6,977
6 75,145.0 0.094 0 299 53.297 0 3,945
7 80,343.5 0.265 0 807 92.187 2 4,120
8 88,109.5 0.109 0 331 53.688 0 4,689
9 93,308.0 0.094 0 316 53.438 0 3,962
10 96,333.0 2.11 2 758 73.454 4 3,608
11 99,234.0 2.375 18 1,230 82.532 14 3,442
12 103,275.5 1.437 0 512 77.36 12 3,317
13 106,300.5 0.203 0 537 69.922 7 3,561
14 109,298.5 0.156 0 432 57.703 2 3,399
15 111,409.0 0.14 0 359 59.594 2 3,618
16 113,124.5 0.093 0 218 58.062 2 4,207
17 114,687.5 0.156 0 282 58.25 2 3,828
18 115,265.5 0.765 0 290 74.032 36 4,074
19 115,973.0 0.172 0 245 68.125 11 4,122
20 116,409.0 0.593 3 272 70.5 23 4,435
21 116,727.5 0.094 0 150 88.5 106 4,933
22 116,868.0 0.094 0 216 98.437 219 5,421
23 116,932.5 0.219 9 251 101.157 247 5,850
24 116,957.5 0.203 6 101 77.063 106 5,684
25 116,958.0 0.047 0 18 63.031 9 4,855
26 116,958.0 0.047 0 26 59.593 6 4,819
27 116,958.0 0.047 0 17 54.031 0 5,413
28 116,958.0 0.031 0 16 53.969 0 4,951
29 116,958.0 0.047 0 17 53.953 0 5,542
30 116,958.0 0.047 0 18 53.781 0 6,878
31 116,958.0 0.031 0 19 53.468 0 4,978
32 116,958.0 0.032 0 17 54.125 0 5,707
33 116,958.0 0.031 0 0 97.079 0 0
34 116,958.0 0.016 0 0 0.86 0 0  
* Trucks per day impacted 
**Results using PAC formulation 
***Results using Myung and Kim [24] formulation 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Assessing networks for vulnerabilities is a challenging planning goal spanning many 
application areas and is of obvious interest in the development of any disaster response 
plan.  Many optimization models have been proposed to facilitate the search for 
vulnerabilities by identifying nodes and arcs vital to network operation.  This variety of 
methods is essential given that disruption to network operation can be hypothesized to 
impact network operation in a number of different ways (e.g., loss of capacity, 
connectivity, efficiency, etc.).  For many types of networks, vulnerability relates to how 
existing patterns of activity or interaction (system flow) is affected by facility damage.  
Recently, several models have been developed to detect facilities whose loss put the most 
system flow at risk and do so to generate bounds on network vulnerability [24-25].   
 
Identification of vital network facilities, as detailed in this paper for the Ohio 
Interstate system, has many potential uses in the disaster planning process.  For example, 
if four transportation links are rendered inoperable, then from a disaster planning 
perspective protection/fortification of the four edges in Figure 3 could effectively 
eliminate/decrease the worst-case disruption to inter-MSA truck traffic.  Given particular 
disaster scenarios of interest (and the critical facilities involved), planning agencies could 
work to devise plans for effective restoration of service for worst-case scenarios.  As a 
range of possible system impacts and recovery strategies might be considered, 
methodologies for selecting optimal response plans could be employed (see [10]).  Aside 
from assessing protection and recovery options, identification of vital arcs/edges could be 
used to inform the strategic siting of rapid response and repair stations to facilitate 
recovery of essential network components.  Alternatively, after a disaster, sets of 
functional network components vital to post-disaster network operation could be 
identified.  For example, one potential goal might be to ensure that remaining 
infrastructure is not further degraded due to unplanned use.  In such a case, vital facilities 
could be identified in accordance to the level of arc/node management resources 
dedicated to this goal.  A similar use could entail the planning and monitoring of 
evacuation networks.  Planning such a network may involve comparison of several route 
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systems based upon which one is most robust (e.g., minimizes the maximum impact to 
flow) to various types of disruptions.  Monitoring applications could include ensuring 
that vital nodes/arcs are adequately patrolled to reduce network impedance and facilitate 
flow. 
 
Thus far, the models proposed for assessing impacts to system flow have focused 
on tracking potential s-t paths of movement.  As discussed earlier, path-based models for 
assessing network vulnerabilities are advantageous from numerous perspectives.  These 
approaches are ideal for analysis of impacts to system operation given that they can deal 
with many sources and sinks and do not require networks to be source-sink planar.  The 
primary advantage to these models lies in identifying which s-t paths are vulnerable.  
Furthermore, path-based models are important given their ability to easily identify a 
lower bound on network disruption [25].  This aspect is also vital to DRP development 
since the ability to minimize system flow loss actually provides a means for prioritizing 
facility repair/restoration/response efforts following a disaster.  For instance, given a 
budget for facility restoration in a particular time frame, minimizing system flow loss can 
provide the set of facilities that can be restored to support or serve the most s-t flow.  
However, modeling approaches involving specification of all s-t paths can quickly 
become computationally prohibitive given the combinatorics involved.   
 
An alternative model structure to the path-based approach, utilizing Path 
Aggregation Constraints (PAC), was developed here for use in flow 
vulnerability/survivability models.  This approach relies on the fact that only 1 and 2-step 
i-j paths need to be explicitly specified.  This approach requires fewer constraints than 
alternative formulations and improves model solvability, doing so without altering the 
intent of the model.  Given their ability to generalize multi-step paths using beginning 
and ending arcs as well as intermediate connections, PAC constraints present an 
extremely useful approach for applications where the number of s-t paths presents 
computational difficulties.  Furthermore, very little effort is needed in identifying PAC 
constraints versus complete path enumeration.  Additionally, the PAC structure is not 
limited to assessment of arc disruption as presented here as a node-based version is a 
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straightforward extension.  Such a modification can be formed by replacing each arc 
variable with a separate variable for each node involved in that arc.  For example, 
Constraints (7) are then written as: 0 ijji ZXX .  An application to truck-based 
interstate transportation in Ohio illustrated the computational benefits of this model 
formulation.  As shown in this application, the use of the PAC formulation presented a 
99% savings in solution time and over an 80% reduction in computational effort (model 
iterations) involved over alternative approaches.  Given its computational benefits, the 
PAC model structure represents another useful and efficient tool for the disaster planning 
and restoration efforts. 
 
Though the PAC formulation has computation benefits over existing system flow 
models, it is not without its limitations.  As discussed previously, path-length thresholds 
have been applied to reduce model size in related system flow approaches.  For example, 
an s-t connection could be considered disconnected if all paths less than a given distance 
or travel time threshold are impacted by a disaster.  Such thresholds cannot be applied in 
the PAC formulation since the availability of a Zij connection may involve multiple paths.  
Therefore, application of the PAC constraints assumes that all network paths are viable 
for s-t interaction.  A related assumption when using system flow models is that any s-t 
connection can equivalently provide s-t service.  However, some instances may arise 
where connectivity may not only be a function of physical connectivity but also of 
transportation cost or available capacity.  Given that paths are no longer explicitly tracked 
in the PAC formulation, tracking path attributes would be challenging.  Finally, the PAC 
approach has been applied to evaluate the vulnerability of system flow in the case where 
worst-case disruptions (maximization of flow loss) are concerned.  Development of a 
similar model structure for identifying the set of facilities involved in the best-case 
disruption (minimization of system flow loss) is an important direction for future 
research. 
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